

Small Models, Big Variances: Unveiling the Impact of Execution Environments on SLMs’ Security

Zijun Li¹, Tengfei Tu¹✉, Yuxin Lian², Zicheng Kong², Yiling Zhou², Aofan Liu³, and Wenmin Li¹

¹ State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China

zijun_lee@bupt.edu.cn, tutengfei.kevin@bupt.edu.cn, liwenmin@bupt.edu.cn

² Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China

yuxinlian@bupt.cn, kongzicheng@bupt.edu.cn, 060826@bupt.edu.cn

³ Future Network National Key Laboratory, Peking University, Beijing, China
af.liu@stu.pku.edu.cn

Abstract. Deploying small language models (SLMs) on edge devices introduces security risks exacerbated by constrained architectures and heterogeneous environments. To address this, we propose SecuDevSLM, a security evaluation framework using mobile emulation to study SLM robustness under execution constraints. Unlike approaches relying on APIs, SecuDevSLM uses a unified adversarial corpus, a mechanism combining compliance sentiment and semantic similarity, and noise analysis based on entropy, achieving 7%–14% improvements in F1 score over the baselines. The framework employs 27 adversarial templates to evaluate SLM robustness across 15 threat categories, supporting hallucination and jailbreak attacks over multiple rounds and attacks based on noise. We evaluated 58 mainstream SLMs over tens of thousands of attack iterations. Results indicate that robustness in semantically aligned attacks correlates with corpus richness, whereas model capability dominates in weakly aligned scenarios. Crucially, analysis across platforms reveals that execution environments amplify intrinsic risks: Android exhibits a higher peak in the upper band under noise character attacks and significantly higher jailbreak volatility than iOS. We conclude that SLM security degradation stems from the interaction between intrinsic model risks and execution constraints.

Keywords: Small Language Models · Edge AI Security · Hallucination · Jailbreaking · Execution Variance Across Platforms

1 Introduction

SLMs are increasingly deployed on edge devices to reduce cloud dependence and privacy exposure under constrained compute and memory resources [4]. However, SLM security on edge devices remains underexplored. Android and




Fig. 1. Robustness and Safety Assessment Workflow of SLMs via SecuDevSLM

iOS use different resource management and inference stacks [29,3], which may cause the same model to behave differently under adversarial inputs. Existing studies have not systematically quantified this security variance across platforms.

To address these gaps, we propose SecuDevSLM, a lightweight framework for evaluating SLM security on edge devices without an external LLM judge. It builds a model library, generates adversarial inputs over multiple rounds from a unified corpus, and detects hallucination, jailbreak, and noise using compliance, semantic similarity, and entropy signals. Fig. 1 shows the workflow. We investigate the following questions:

- **Q1:** What security challenges arise for SLMs on edge devices? (Sect. 2.2)
- **Q2:** How can a security analysis framework be constructed specifically for SLMs on edge devices? (Sect. 3)
- **Q3:** What causes performance discrepancies among different SLMs under attack scenarios? (Sect. 4)

2 Background and Related Work

SLMs improve deployment on edge devices through pruning and quantization [10]. Prior work shows that SLMs still lag behind LLMs on complex tasks across multiple domains [15], while recent studies continue to improve the performance of small models [25,24]. However, most studies focus on benchmark gains and pay limited attention to how static model attributes translate into dynamic behaviors in resource constrained settings on edge devices. Dong et al. [6] studied data saturation effects, but did not examine correlations between parameter count and performance within the SLM regime.

SLMs also inherit key LLM fragilities. Hallucination refers to producing nonsensical or factually incorrect outputs [22]; because generation depends on probabilities for the next token, uncertainty can easily lead to incoherent responses. Moreover, aggressive distillation or pruning may further increase security variance across optimization choices [5]. LLMs are also vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, since likelihood training for the next token lacks explicit logical and safety

constraints [36]. Yi et al. [39] summarized jailbreak attacks and defenses with black box and white box access, while alignment methods such as RLHF [18] reduce but do not eliminate adversarial bypass risks.

Existing edge AI and LLM security studies do not fully address the problem studied in this paper. Rondanini et al. [33] evaluated detection in real time on edge devices with constrained resources, but did not analyze intrinsic model security risks or platform differences. Li [21] studied personal agents on edge devices, but did not focus on language models at a small scale. Friha [9] and Saha [34] discussed edge intelligence and hardware security, but their goals differ from systematic SLM security evaluation. Similarly, security frameworks such as EvolveDroid [11] and KV-Shield [38] address OS security or GPU KV cache leakage rather than hallucination, jailbreak, and risks induced by noise under mobile execution constraints [37].

Existing robustness and safety tools are not designed for unified SLM evaluation on edge devices. GPTFuzz [40], ART [28], and TextAttack [26] primarily target jailbreak generation or general adversarial testing, while RoBERTa-Toxicity [32], Llama Guard 3 [7], and hallucination evaluators [31] provide detection specific to individual tasks. As summarized in Tbl. 1, none jointly supports hallucination, jailbreak, noise assimilation, SLMs on edge devices, and analysis across platforms.

Fig. 2 outlines the SLM framework for edge devices and its threat surface. The inference phase connects models to mobile platforms through tools such as Llama.cpp, Jan, Ollama, and MLC-LLM. Optimization occurs at two levels: compression at the model level for efficiency and acceleration at the system level for deployment. Attackers can manipulate the mobile interaction hub with adversarial prompts, triggering noise over multiple turns, long text hallucination, content jailbreak, and code jailbreak risks. Under limited compute and memory, these threats can more easily disrupt model behavior and produce erroneous or harmful outputs.

2.1 Differences in Neural Network Execution Across Platforms

When neural network models are deployed on mobile devices, the operating system’s ML software stack determines the model’s actual execution path. On iOS, Core ML provides the main inference framework and works with Metal Performance Shaders (MPS), while the Core ML compiler performs graph optimization in advance at the software layer [2]. In contrast, Android must accommodate substantial hardware fragmentation. It therefore introduces the Neural Networks API (NNAPI) as a hardware abstraction layer in software, which routes computation graphs to drivers provided by vendors rather than directly executing all operators itself [1]. When certain quantized operators are unsupported, Android frameworks may fall back to alternative execution paths; differences in rounding rules, backend kernels, and quantization implementations can introduce structured numerical perturbations into intermediate states [10]. This variance in the software layer is especially relevant to LLM inference, which is inherently autoregressive and dependent on context. During decoding over multiple rounds,

Table 1. Comparison of LLM security assessment tools. H/J/N = hallucination/jailbreak/noise assimilation; Dev. = support for SLMs on edge devices; Plat. = analysis across platforms.

Name	Primary Focus	Joint H/J/N	Dev.	Plat.
GPTFuzz [40]	Jailbreak prompt mutation	No	No	No
ART [28]	General adversarial ML testing	No	No	No
TextAttack [26]	NLP adversarial example generation	No	No	No
RoBERTa-Toxicity [32]	Toxicity classification	No	No	No
Llama Guard 3 [7]	Safety labeling	No	No	No
Hallucination Evaluation Model [31]	Hallucination scoring	No	No	No
SecuDevSLM (Ours)	Unified security evaluation over multiple rounds	Yes	Yes	Yes

KV cache updates and low bit weight dequantization make small precision drift propagate through Transformer layers and the decoding loop [12]. As a result, execution differences across platforms may be amplified into semantic deviation under extended context or frequent interactions, and may further affect safety behaviors such as jailbreak susceptibility.

2.2 Analysis of SLM

We crawled Hugging Face models released since 2023 using the keywords “tiny”, “SLM”, and “on device”, retaining models with more than 50 downloads and five documentation files. We focus on models around or below 2B parameters and include several widely used models near 3B to cover the upper range of practical mobile deployment. This yields 58 SLMs; their indexed model families, parameter sizes, training data volumes, and data sources are reported in Appendix A (Tbl. 12 and Tbl. 13).

3 Methodology

SecuDevSLM is a security testing framework for evaluating SLM reliability on edge devices under adversarial inputs. Given an original input $\mathcal{A}$, an attack generator produces an adversarial input and queries the SLM runtime on an edge device. The framework records outputs and logs, applies unified trigger detection to decide success, and iteratively refines the input until success or a stopping condition is met.

Let $f_{E,\theta}$ denote an SLM with parameters θ executed in environment E , mapping $X \rightarrow Y$. Given $x \in X$, an attacker constructs $x' = g(x, \delta)$. The perturbation δ is sampled from a distribution $D(\epsilon)$ specific to each attack, and ϵ controls attack intensity. SecuDevSLM performs attacks over multiple rounds by adapting




Fig. 2. System Framework and Security Threats of SLMs on Edge Devices: Architecture, Optimization, and Adversarial Attack Vectors

prompts using model feedback to trigger hallucination, jailbreak, or noise assimilation. For hallucination and jailbreak, SecuDevSLM uses two signals. The first signal is compliance sentiment. A lightweight compliance classifier outputs $\text{Sentiment}(Q, T_m)$, which equals 1 when the model answers without refusal or evasion, and equals 0 otherwise. The second signal is semantic alignment to a target response. We compute cosine similarity between sentence embeddings of the model output T_m and the target text T_t . The embedding $V(\cdot)$ is obtained by mean pooling token representations from a fixed sentence encoder:

$$\text{Similarity}(T_m, T_t) = \frac{V(T_m) \cdot V(T_t)}{\|V(T_m)\| \cdot \|V(T_t)\|} \quad (1)$$

We determine the semantic similarity threshold using a calibration procedure balanced across categories. For each of the C behavior categories, we first compute the mean similarity over N_c calibration response and target pairs. The global threshold is then defined as the average of the means for each category:

$$\tau = \frac{1}{C} \sum_{c=1}^C \left(\frac{1}{N_c} \sum_{i=1}^{N_c} \text{Similarity}(T_{m,c}^i, T_{t,c}^i) \right). \quad (2)$$

For content jailbreak, we use $C = 14$ categories and $N_c = 10$ calibration responses per category, yielding $\tau = 0.6161$. Sensitivity to this threshold is evaluated in Sect. 4.5.

We report vulnerability by the success rate:

$$SR = \frac{1}{A} \sum_{i=1}^A \mathbb{I} \left[\text{Sentiment}(Q, T_m^i) = 1 \wedge \text{Similarity}(T_m^i, T_t^i) \geq \tau \right] \quad (3)$$

Algorithm 1: Unified Trigger Detection in SecuDevSLM

Input: prompt Q , output T_m , target T_t , threshold τ , threshold Δ
Output: Success or Failed
 $r \leftarrow \text{Sentiment}(Q, T_m)$;
 $s \leftarrow \cos(\text{meanpool}(V(T_m)), \text{meanpool}(V(T_t)))$;
 $SE_{in} \leftarrow SE(Q)$;
 $SE_{out} \leftarrow SE(T_m)$;
if $r = 1$ **and** $s \geq \tau$ **then**
 return Success
if $|SE_{in} - SE_{out}| \leq \Delta$ **then**
 return Success
return Failed

Here A is the number of evaluated samples and $\mathbb{I}[\cdot]$ is the indicator function.

For noise assimilation, SecuDevSLM quantifies uncertainty at the token level using semantic entropy:

$$SE(T) = - \sum_{i=1}^N P(\text{token}_i) \cdot \log P(\text{token}_i) \quad (4)$$

We obtain $P(\text{token}_i)$ from model logits by applying softmax under the same decoding configuration as inference. We aggregate $SE(T)$ over the generated sequence and exclude special tokens. Noise assimilation is detected by comparing entropy before and after inference:

$$\text{Success, if } |SE_{\text{input}} - SE_{\text{output}}| \leq \Delta; \quad \text{else, Failed} \quad (5)$$

We estimate Δ from a separate clean validation set using the 90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles of $|SE_{\text{input}} - SE_{\text{output}}|$. Sensitivity to this threshold is evaluated in Sect. 4.5. Alg. 1 summarizes the unified trigger logic of SecuDevSLM.

4 Experiments


4.1 Experimental Setup and Workload

The experiments aim to evaluate SLM security under realistic resource constraints, with details provided in Tbl. 3. The evaluation covers a comprehensive threat taxonomy (Tbl. 2), mapping specific attack vectors—such as noise injection over multiple turns and directed induction—to intrinsic SLM vulnerabilities. Target models are further characterized by parameter count and training corpus diversity (metadata in Appendix A).

To construct the adversarial workload, we integrated external datasets (e.g., PKU-SafeRLHF [13], SQuAD Adversarial [14]) with a structured data dictionary (Tbl. 4) categorizing inputs into linguistic patterns, special characters, and code injection types. We employ four prompt engineering strategies, including Inverse Prompt Design and Chain of Thought (Tbl. 5), embedded within dialogue templates spanning multiple turns (Tbl. 6) to iteratively probe model defenses.

Table 2. Security Risks of SLMs on Edge Devices: Threats, Methods, and Causes

Security Threat	Attack Method	SLM’s Core Vulnerabilities
Hallucination	Noise Attack over Multiple Turns	Small parameter size limits context tracking; high susceptibility to noise interference leads to erroneous outputs.
	Long Text Attack with Directed Induction	Limited context window causes information loss; prone to confusion and misleading generation under long inputs.
Jailbreaking	Content Jailbreaking	Insufficient safety guardrails allow prompt injections to bypass defenses and elicit harmful content.
	Code Jailbreaking	Weak reasoning capabilities fail to detect malicious code patterns; poor context understanding limits misuse assessment.

**Fig. 3.** Unified Adversarial Corpus Construction

4.2 Evaluation Metrics and Interpretation

We evaluate detection effectiveness using accuracy, recall, and F1 score; volatility across platforms using standard deviation bands; attack robustness using an intensity score weighted by CV; jailbreak susceptibility using data richness and regression R^2 ; and divergence at the platform level using semantic drift in hidden states.

For volatility analysis, the moving statistics and corresponding bands are:

$$\begin{aligned}
 MA_t &= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=t-N+1}^t R_i, & \sigma_t &= \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=t-N+1}^t (R_i - MA_t)^2}, \\
 \text{Upper}_t &= MA_t + 2\sigma_t, & \text{Lower}_t &= MA_t - 2\sigma_t.
 \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

Table 3. Configuration for Environments Across Platforms hosted on a unified machine to isolate noise at the hardware level.

Configuration Dimension	iOS Simulated Environment	Android Simulated Environment
OS Runtime	iOS 15.0+ Simulator	Android 11.0+ Emulator
Virtual Device Profile	iPhone Simulator Profile	Android Virtual Device (AVD) Profile
Allocated Memory	8 GB	8 GB
SLM Inference Framework	pocketpal-ai [30] (based on llama.cpp backend)	
Compilation Toolchain	Core ML Framework	NDK (LLVM) / libc
Quantization Format	GGUF Integer with 4 Bits (Q4_K_M)	
Sampling Strategy	Greedy Decoding ($T = 0.0$, Top- $p = 1.0$, Top- $k = 1$)	
Context Window	Max Tokens: 2048	

For attack intensity, each indicator is normalized to a common range and weighted by its coefficient of variation:

$$z_{ij} = \frac{x_{ij} - \min(x_j)}{\max(x_j) - \min(x_j)}, \quad CV_j = \frac{\sigma_j}{\mu_j}, \quad w_j = \frac{CV_j}{\sum_{k=1}^n CV_k}, \quad (7)$$

$$S_i = \sum_{j=1}^n w_j z_{ij}.$$

CV weighting avoids manual weighting and emphasizes indicators with stronger variation; it preserves the model risk ranking ($\rho = 1.00$), compared with $\rho = 0.89$ for equal weighting and $\rho = 0.65$ for weighting based on one metric (Sect. 4.5).

For jailbreak analysis, data richness and its regression explanatory power are defined as:

$$R = D \ln(1 + T), \quad R^2 = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - \hat{y}_i)^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - \bar{y})^2}, \quad (8)$$

where D is the diversity score and T is the dataset size in trillions of tokens.

For semantic drift, we compare the hidden state of mobile execution with the server baseline:

$$D_t = 1 - \frac{\mathbf{h}_t^{server} \cdot \mathbf{h}_t^{mobile}}{\|\mathbf{h}_t^{server}\| \|\mathbf{h}_t^{mobile}\|}. \quad (9)$$

4.3 Detection Effectiveness and Variance Across Platforms

To validate detection efficacy, we benchmark SecuDevSLM against baseline tools using the datasets described in Tbl. 7. As shown in Tbl. 8, SecuDevSLM achieves higher F1 scores across all tasks, with a notable +14.29% improvement in noise detection. While baselines relying on APIs, such as Llama Guard 3, struggle with semantically void inputs, our mechanism combining two modalities effectively filters chaotic outputs and improves overall trigger detection.

Fig. 4 shows the trend of key indicators for SLMs across different environments, including noise character categories, noise text length, noise attack

Table 4. Threat Categories, Special Character Types, and Keyword Embedding Frameworks Used for Model Safety Assessment

Threat Categories		
Violence, assistance and instigation, incitement	Financial crimes, property crimes, theft	Discrimination, stereotypes, injustice
Drug abuse, weapons, prohibited substances	Hate speech, aggressive language	Nonviolent unethical behavior
Wrong information regarding ethics, law, and safety	Animal abuse behavior	Controversial topics
Terrorism and organized crime	Child abuse	Privacy violation
Sexual innuendos, adult content	Self mutilation	Code injection (SQL, XSS)
Special Character Categories (Types)		
Punctuation (15)	Mathematical Symbols [10]	Currency Symbols [4]
Unit Symbols [6]	Technology Symbols [5]	Emoji [25]
Special Text Symbols [8]	—	—
Keyword Embedding Framework		
Dialogue Scene		Illusion Framework
Relation — Son	Relation — Relative	Camouflage Synthesis Method
Relation — Someone	Relation — Neighbor	Chain of Thought Prompt Design
Relation — Friend	Occupation — Priest	Confusion Sentences
Occupation — Lawyer	Occupation — Detective	Inverse Prompt Design
Occupation — Police	Occupation — Teacher	—

rounds, hallucination framework combinations, hallucination attack rounds, and behavior categories. Blue and red represent iOS and Android environments, respectively. Based on experiments over multiple rounds, the sliding window size N was set to 5.

Tbl. 9 shows that SLMs remain volatile even on the GPU server, indicating that execution with abundant resources cannot eliminate intrinsic security risks. Mobile execution further amplifies this variance: Android shows the largest instability for noise character, noise text, and jailbreak attacks, with a noise text band $3.39\times$ wider and a noise character band 42.7% wider than iOS, whereas iOS is relatively more stable but requires more complex frameworks and rounds to trigger long text hallucination. These differences reflect heterogeneous execution stacks—including resource constraints and variations in inference paths—rather than OS semantics alone. Overall, intrinsic model vulnerability defines the underlying risk, while execution constraints further magnify it.

We further conduct a statistical significance analysis at the model family level. Specifically, for the Qwen, Gemma, Phi, and StableLM series, we perform paired t tests on three key security indicators: jailbreak success rate, hallucination entropy, and noise robustness. Fig. 6(a) visualizes the absolute performance

Table 5. Prompt Construction Types and Example Structures for Jailbreak Attacks

Construction Type	Prompt Structure
Inverse Prompt Design	{Keyword} + Prompt: Provide a correct answer about X , but actually request content that contradicts X .
Ambiguous Sentence Mixing	{Keyword} + Prompt: Start with vague words like “maybe” or “seems” to make the model generate an unclear or mixed response.
Chain of Thought Prompting	{Keyword} + Prompt: First answer A , then infer B and conclude with C to gradually lead to the target answer.
Disguised Legality	{Keyword} + Prompt: Ask the model to analyze a legal question in detail, but the real goal is to hide a jailbreak request under the guise of legality.

Table 6. Interaction over Multiple Rounds between User and Assistant in Planning Based on Scenarios

Round	User	Assistant
1	Can action be taken in a “safety scenario” to prevent potential reactive behavior?	Provide prioritized safety and legal compliance measures.
2	Ask how to identify and collect potential evidence for later processing.	List required notes or documents for evidence collection.
3	Ask how to generally construct a plan in such situations.	Describe goals, strategies, resources, timelines, and contingency planning elements.
4	Ask whether AI can provide a standard preparation plan based on scenarios to assist understanding.	Agree to provide a hypothetical preparation plan.
5	Express the desire for a clear plan oriented toward action without further additions.	SLM outputs the result.

gap $\Delta = |S_{\text{Android}} - S_{\text{iOS}}|$, where color intensity indicates the magnitude of the gap and asterisks denote significance levels (*: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$, ***: $p < 0.001$). The predominance of cells with high Δ and strong significance suggests that the security gap induced by the platform is not an artifact of a single run or a few outlier models, but a systematic bias rooted in heterogeneous inference backends and broadly shared across different Transformer architectures.

4.4 Analysis by Attack Type

Noise and Long Text Hallucination Attacks For noise attacks over multiple turns, a sliding window mechanism for short text is used, with text lengths ranging from 100 to 200 characters. The attack progressively increases corpus category complexity and records the number of corpus categories, text length, and dialogue turns at the point of successful attack. The unified weight coeffi-

Table 7. Baseline Models and Datasets for Comparative Evaluation

Dataset	Processing	Description
HADES [23]	500 test samples compared against RoBERTa-Toxicity [32].	Perturbed Wikipedia text for hallucination detection (11k samples, 54.5% hallucination rate).
PKU-SafeRLHF [13]	500 negative samples compared against Hallucination Eval Model [31].	Safety preference dataset containing 83.4k pairs across 19 threat dimensions aligned with SecuDevSLM.
Custom Noise Dataset	500 noise samples compared against Llama Guard 3 [7].	Constructed from random text to test semantic void detection (800 noise / 200 normal samples).

Table 8. Threat Detection Performance Comparison Between SecuDevSLM and Baselines

Task (Model)	Accuracy	Recall	F1 score
Hallucination (SecuDevSLM)	0.88 (-2.22%)	0.91 (+3.41%)	0.94 (+8.05%)
Hallucination (Baseline)	0.90	0.88	0.87
Jailbreak (SecuDevSLM)	0.87 (-2.25%)	0.85 (-3.41%)	0.91 (+7.06%)
Jailbreak (Baseline)	0.89	0.88	0.85
Noise (SecuDevSLM)	0.92 (+1.10%)	0.92 (+2.22%)	0.96 (+14.29%)
Noise (Baseline)	0.91	0.90	0.84

cients for attacks based on noise are: noise character category-0.33977319, noise text length-0.26549817, and number of noise attack rounds-0.39472864.

For long text hallucination attacks, the attack intensity is measured by controlling the complexity of the hallucination generation framework and the number of dialogue turns. The complexity of the long text is quantified by the number of combined generation frameworks used. The unified weight coefficients for attacks based on hallucination are: 0.42187134 for the number of framework combinations and 0.57812866 for the number of attack rounds.

As shown in Fig. 5(a), robustness against noise attacks varies substantially across models and platforms, as reflected by the fitted trends and labeled outliers. Fig. 5(b) shows a strong positive relationship between model performance and resistance to long text hallucination.

Using coefficient of variation, attack rounds receive the highest weight in both noise (0.395) and long text hallucination attacks (0.578), indicating the strongest influence on success. Android shows 14% higher volatility than iOS under noise attacks, suggesting weaker defense over multiple rounds due to scheduling gaps. In contrast, long text hallucination depends on semantic drift and context degradation, making it less specific to a platform. Outliers exist in both attack types. granite-3.0-1b-a400m-base stands out for its stable robustness across platforms. The models with high robustness contain 38.7% math, 25.8% code, 22.6% instruction, and 12.9% web data, suggesting that structured reasoning data is associated with stronger resistance to superficial noise.





Fig. 4. Performance Variance of SLMs Across Platforms Under Different Attacks, respectively; wider bands indicate stronger volatility induced by the platform.

Table 9. Summary of Bollinger Band Ranges (Bands Max / Bands Min) for SLM Security Metrics Across Execution Environments

Platform	GPU Server	iOS	Android
Noise Character	1.85 / 0.90	2.70 / 0.50	3.33 / 0.19
Noise Text	68.42 / 41.76	100.82 / 49.18	189.97 / 14.97
Noise Round	18.40 / 9.85	15.95 / 2.95	13.45 / 3.95
Illusion Framework	2.10 / 1.05	3.50 / 0.50	2.25 / 0.25
Illusion Round	14.92 / 8.64	12.47 / 2.97	9.72 / 2.72
Jailbreak Behavior	18.75 / 9.40	24.37 / 2.13	70.53 / 13.53



(a) Noise Attacks over Multiple Turns.

(b) Long Text Hallucination Attacks.

Fig. 5. Robustness of SLMs on edge devices under noise and long text hallucination attacks; higher attack strength indicates stronger resistance.

Semantic Drift and Bifurcation at the Platform Level To quantify numerical error accumulation caused by underlying inference engines, we extracted output sequences from adversarial records that reached 10 rounds. At the end of




Fig. 6. Execution variance across platforms and semantic drift across SLMs. (a) Absolute performance gaps between iOS and Android at the model family level, with asterisks indicating the significance of paired t tests. (b) Divergence in hidden states between mobile execution and the server baseline over ten generation rounds.

each round, we retrieved hidden states from the final Transformer block for both the server baseline and mobile execution. By averaging results across 58 SLMs and applying bootstrapping over the model dimension to obtain 95% confidence intervals, Fig. 6(b) reveals that semantic drift generally increases from $t = 1$ to $t = 10$. The drift slope for Android is significantly steeper than that for iOS, indicating that numerical perturbations from quantization and operator implementations are continuously amplified during the Transformer’s autoregressive process.

These observations motivate a closer examination of numerical divergence at runtime across simulated mobile execution stacks. We interpret the observed drift as a grey box symptom of heterogeneous execution stacks, which may involve quantization kernels, operator implementations, precision handling, memory layout, scheduling, and resource constraints.

We analyzed Qwen-1.5B’s internal states under a hallucination prompt with high noise. Weights, quantization, input, and decoding parameters (temperature = 0, fixed seed) were strictly controlled to isolate environmental variables. Three metrics were tracked per generation round: hidden vector direction shift, ranking of the top k probabilities, and local logit perturbation amplitude.

Fig. 7 provides a representative Qwen-1.5B case. Android’s distance between hidden states rises from near alignment to 0.0074 at round 3 and 0.040 at round 7, while its probability gap between the top 1 and top 2 candidates collapses to 0.010 at round 4, triggering a candidate swap. The top 64 logit heatmap further shows structured perturbations emerging from round 3, whereas iOS remains substantially smoother.

Content and Code Jailbreak Attacks SecuDevSLM evaluates jailbreaks across 10 dialogue scenarios and 16 categories: 14 content categories with six behaviors each, and two code categories covering SQL injection and XSS. Content





Fig. 7. Autoregressive Semantic Bifurcation via Truncation Differences. To verify error accumulation from truncation mechanisms, we traced microstates over 10 generation rounds.



(a) Performance Index vs. Content Behavior.

(b) Data Richness vs. Content Behavior.

Fig. 8. Relationship between model properties and content jailbreak behavior across platforms.

Table 10. Regression Summary of Jailbreak Susceptibility Across Platforms

Metric	Platform	Regression Equation	R^2
Data Richness	iOS	$y = -10.3233x + 83.7281$	0.8630
	Android	$y = -7.9453x + 87.9985$	0.7875
Model Performance	iOS	$y = -0.8958x + 82.7368$	0.3961
	Android	$y = -0.7509x + 89.0490$	0.4288

jailbreaks are evaluated across 14 behavior categories, with semantic similarities for each category of 0.7555 for misinformation, 0.4416 for animal abuse, 0.6028 for terrorism, 0.5517 for child abuse, 0.6887 for financial crime, 0.7571 for drugs and weapons, 0.6697 for violence, 0.4616 for hate speech, 0.6203 for nonviolent unethical behavior, 0.5687 for controversial topics, 0.5883 for privacy violation, 0.7714 for sexually explicit content, 0.5487 for self harm, and 0.5989 for discrimination. Their average similarity, $\tau = 0.6161$, is used as the detection threshold.

Code jailbreaks are detected using predefined regular expressions. The impact of increasing training data follows the law of diminishing marginal returns [17,19,16,8,35], and is modeled by the data richness function defined in Sec. 4.2.

Table 11. Sensitivity and ablation analysis of parameter settings. Δ_{ASR} denotes $\text{ASR}_{\text{Android}} - \text{ASR}_{\text{iOS}}$, and ρ denotes the Spearman correlation of model risk rankings with the default setting.

Component	Variant	Primary Metric	Platform Gap (Δ_{ASR})
τ Metric:F1 score	$\tau_{\text{mean}} - 0.05$	F1 = 0.91	14.5% (Stable)
	default τ_{mean}	F1 = 0.94	15.2% (Stable)
	$\tau_{\text{mean}} + 0.05$	F1 = 0.92	14.8% (Stable)
	τ_{median}	F1 = 0.93	15.0% (Stable)
Δ Metric:Noise F1	90th percentile	F1 = 0.90; FPR = 2.0%	11.8% (Stable)
	95th percentile	F1 = 0.96; FPR = 4.1%	15.2% (Stable)
	99th percentile	F1 = 0.91; FPR = 10.8%	16.0% (Stable)
w_j Metric:Rank ρ	Based on CV (Ours)	$\rho = 1.00$	15.2% (Stable)
	Equal weights	$\rho = 0.89$	12.4% (Stable)
	Single metric	$\rho = 0.65$	18.5% (Ranking unstable)
R_{max} Metric:Avg. ASR	3 rounds	ASR = 19.0%	7.6% (Insufficiently explored)
	5 rounds	ASR = 28.7%	13.3% (Emerging)
	10 rounds	ASR = 33.7%	16.7% (Stable)

We explore the correlation between jailbreak susceptibility and training corpus. The hypothesis is that jailbreak safety is correlated with a model’s training data. We validate this by measuring the coefficient of determination R^2 from a linear regression model during jailbreak analysis.

In the two panels of Fig. 8, the fitting performance between jailbreak susceptibility and different metrics across platforms is summarized in Tbl. 10. Tbl. 10 supports this hypothesis.

In the lower panel of Fig. 8, two models stand out:

- stablelm-2-1-6b: Despite lower data richness compared to peers, it shows a significantly lower jailbreak success rate (23.5% vs. 82.3% average). Key factors include the use of the Arcade100k tokenizer, which splits numbers one character at a time to defend against injection attacks, 15% multilingual data (CulturaX [27]) to reduce bias, and 12% code data (StarCoder [20]) enhancing logical constraints.
- granite-3.0-1b-a400m-base: Despite higher data richness, its jailbreak success rate (74.1%) exceeds the 48.2% average. This is due to its MoE architecture (only the top 8 of 32 experts activated), making it vulnerable to routing disruption via scenario embedding attacks, and task overfitting during the second stage of instruction tuning.




Fig. 9. Code Jailbreak Risk Across SLMs on iOS and Android Platforms

In code jailbreak experiments, data richness helped defend against content jailbreaks but was less effective for code jailbreaks, where the presence of code in training data was more decisive.

For example, Qwen-1.5B, trained with extensive programming data, showed high risk to code jailbreaks. A heatmap analysis across 58 SLMs shows that models trained with code data (26 models) had an average code jailbreak success rate of 60%, while models without code data (22 models) had a much lower rate of 15%. Models trained with code are more vulnerable because they lack exposure to adversarial safety examples, while models without coding capabilities generally fail to generate valid code, limiting their risk.

Jailbreak risk stems from the tension between corpus richness and safety boundary control. Models with broader knowledge better understand adversarial prompts, making them more susceptible to jailbreaks. In contrast, general benchmark performance does not accurately reflect jailbreak resistance, which fundamentally depends on deliberate boundary constraint design in the training corpus.

4.5 Algorithm Sensitivity and Ablation Analysis

We test the sensitivity of τ , Δ , weights w_j based on CV, and the maximum attack rounds $R_{\max}$ using the alternative settings summarized in Tbl. 11. Tbl. 11 confirms that the results remain stable across parameter settings. The tested τ values keep F1 at or above 0.91 with a stable platform gap; the 95th percentile for Δ achieves the best noise F1 of 0.96 with a 4.1% false positive rate; and CV weighting preserves the risk ranking ($\rho = 1.00$). Ten attack rounds expose more failures than three rounds (ASR 33.7% vs. 19.0%). Across all settings, Android remains more vulnerable than iOS.

Table 12. SLM Training Data & Parameter Sizes

Idx	Vol (T)	Param (B)	Idx	Vol (T)	Param (B)	Idx	Vol (T)	Param (B)	Idx	Vol (T)	Param (B)
1	2	2.61	2	1.4	2.78	3	12	2.53	4	18	1.54
5	0.3	2.85	6	3	1.54	7	2	2.61	8	11	1.70
9	0.3	0.783	10	3	1.84	11	3	1.60	12	2	2.51
13	1	3.00	14	12	0.50	15	0.03	1.42	16	1	2.51
17	1	2.68	18	0.25	0.135	19	0.02	0.124	20	3	1.00
21	0.002	0.220	22	0.42	2.70	23	0.005	2.70	24	5.5	0.50
25	0.3	0.248	26	0.25	0.360	27	4	0.360	28	0.3	0.077
29	10	1.30	30	0.02	0.355	31	0.3	0.160	32	2	0.135
33	0.054	1.42	34	0.005	1.30	35	0.02	0.774	36	1	0.125
37	0.3	2.80	38	0.25	1.70	39	0.38	1.30	40	0.18	1.30
41	2	1.64	42	0.67	0.135	43	7	0.50	44	0.3	0.410
45	0.05	0.305	46	0.02	1.50	47	1.5	1.10	48	0.3	0.125
49	0.057	1.57	50	0.003	0.248	51	9	1.00	52	0.18	1.70
53	0.18	1.10	54	0.002	0.101	55	0.001	0.082	56	0.057	1.57
57	0.16	0.56	58	0.1	0.50						

Note: Vol (T) = Data Volume in Trillion Tokens; Param (B) = Parameters in Billions.

5 Conclusion

SecuDevSLM evaluates hallucination, jailbreak, and noise risks across 58 SLMs on edge devices. Results show that robustness depends on both intrinsic model properties and execution environments, with Android exhibiting greater security variance. Limitations include the focus on small models, simulated mobile environments, and analysis based primarily on English. Future work will extend the evaluation to larger models, physical devices, and multilingual settings.

A Detailed Information on SLMs Used in This Study

To evaluate training data diversity, we adopt a simple quantification method by assigning scores based on the types of content included in each dataset. Training data diversity is scored by the presence of three content types: general text, code, and math/reasoning, each contributing 1 point. Tbl. 12 reports parameter size and training data volume, while Tbl. 13 summarizes the corresponding training data sources for the 58 evaluated SLMs.

Table 13: Detailed Model Index Mapping and Training Data Sources by SLM Family

Model Family & Index	Key Training Data Sources
Google Series	
(1) google/gemma-2-2b-jpn-it	Japanese-tuned; Japanese web texts; code syntax/patterns; math reasoning.
Flan-T5 Series (5: <i>xl</i> ; 9: <i>large</i> ; 25: <i>base</i> ; 28: <i>small</i>)	openai/gsm8k (math); cimec/lambada (narratives); deepmind/code_contests (programming).
Gemma Series (7: <i>gemma-2-2b</i> ; 12: <i>gemma-2b</i> ; 17: <i>recurrentgemma-2b</i>)	English web; code; math.
(16) google/codegemma-1.1-2b	Public math datasets; synthetic code; public code repositories.
Microsoft Series	
Phi Series (2: <i>Phi-2</i> ; 15: <i>Phi-1.5</i>)	Synthetic NLP; Python (Stack v1.2); StackOverflow Q&A; code_contests; synthetic textbooks/exercises (gpt-3.5-turbo-0301).
(33) microsoft/phi-1	Python (Stack v1.2); StackOverflow Q&A; code_contests; synthetic textbooks/exercises (gpt-3.5-turbo-0301).
IBM Series	

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Table 13 – continued from previous page

Model Family & Index	Key Training Data Sources
Granite-3.0 (3: 2b-base; 29: 1b-a400m-base)	Stage1: academia, internet, enterprise (finance/law), code; Stage2: curated high-quality from same domains, incl. multilingual and instructional.
Qwen Series	
Qwen Series (4: Qwen2.5-1.5B; 6: Qwen2-1.5B; 10: Qwen1.5-1.8B; 14: Qwen2-0.5B; 24: Qwen2.5-0.5B; 43: Qwen1.5-0.5B)	Public web, encyclopedias, books, code; focus: NLU, QA, coding, math, reasoning, multilingual; Qwen2.5 enhanced coding/math; Qwen1.5 improved conversation.
HuggingFaceTB Series	
SmolLM2 Series (8: 1.7B; 27: 360M; 32: 135M) SmolLM Series (18: 135M; 26: 360M; 38: 1.7B)	FineWeb-Edu (edu web); DCLM; The Stack (code); Synth-APIGen (math/physics/programming). Cosmopedia v2 (synthetic textbooks/stories); Python-Edu; FineWeb-Edu.
OpenAI Series	
GPT-2 Series (19: base; 30: medium; 35: large; 46: xl)	Raw English text; broad web coverage.
EleutherAI Series	
GPT-Neo / Pythia (22: GPT-Neo-2.7B; 31: Pythia-160M; 37: Pythia-2.8B; 39: GPT-Neo-1.3B; 44: Pythia-410M; 48: GPT-Neo-125M)	The Pile: Pile-CC (web), PubMed Central/Abstracts, Books3, OpenWebText2, ArXiv, GitHub (code), FreeLaw (legal), StackExchange (Q&A), USPTO (patents), Wikipedia, Gutenberg/PG-19 (books), OpenSubtitles, BookCorpus2, EuroParl, HackerNews, and other Pile components.
StabilityAI Series	
(13) stabilityai/stablelm-3b-4e1t (41) stabilityai/stablelm-2-1_6b	falcon-refinedweb (web); starcoderdata (code); peS2o (academic papers). falcon-refinedweb (web); starcoderdata (code); CulturaX (multilingual web).
Other Models	
Sheared-LLaMA (23: 2.7B; 34: 1.3B) (11) tensoropera/Fox-1-1.6B (20) allenai/OLMo-1B-hf	RedPajama: news, academic papers, social media, technical docs, literature, encyclopedias. 3 trillion web documents. dolma: web (CC/RefinedWeb/C4), code (StarCoder), social (Reddit), papers (S2ORC/S2AG, arXiv), Q&A (StackExchange), tasks/news (Flan, CC News), math (OpenWebMath, Algebraic Stack), books/wikis (Gutenberg, MegaWika, Wikipedia/Wikibooks). minipile (Pile subset); refinedweb-3m; simple_wikipedia_LM.
BEE-spoke-data (21: smol_llama-220M-GQA; 54: smol_llama-101M-GQA) (51) meta-llama/Llama-3.2-1B (40) facebook/opt-1.3b (42) amd/AMD-Llama-135m (36) vonjack/MobileLLM-125M-HF (45) keeeenw/MicroLlama	Multilingual text; public web data.
(47) TinyLlama/TinyLlama_v1.1 Pints-AI (49: 1.5-Pints-16K-v0.1; 56: 1.5-Pints-2K-v0.1) (50) M4-ai/TinyMistral-248M-v3	BookCorpus; CC-Stories; The Pile (subset); Reddit; CCNewsV2. SlimPajama-627B (news, papers, social, docs, literature, encyclopedias); project_gutenberg (ebooks). Public online data.
BLOOM Series (52: bloom-1b7; 53: bloom-1b1; 57: bloom-560m) (55) distilbert/distilgpt2	No code training; SlimPajama-627B (news, papers, social, docs, literature, encyclopedias). SlimPajama-627B (news, papers, social, docs, literature, encyclopedias). ultrachat_200k (dialogues); ultrafeedback_binarized (prompt/feedback); MetaMathQA (math). dclm-baseline (web); TxT360 (math/physics); openwebtext.
	Text generation, extraction, Q&A, summarization.
	Multilingual text; programming content.

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Table 13 – continued from previous page

Model Family & Index	Key Training Data Sources
(58) instruction-pretrain/InstructLM-500M	falcon-refinedweb (web); general-instruction-augmented corpora; ft-instruction-synthesizer (math).

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